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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION LAW
KATHRYN A. GRACE*
COREY J. WRIGHT**
THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE provides an overview of recent,important developments in aviation law from February 1,
2016, to January 1, 2017. This article will cover cases concerning
the topics of federal preemption, forum non conveniens, interna-
tional treaties including the Montreal Convention, and federal
jurisdiction.
I. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
The 2016 case Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp. is one of the
most significant decisions in the area of federal preemption.1
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the General Aviation Revitalization
Act of 1994 (GARA), and regulations promulgated by the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration (FAA) do not categorically pre-
empt state products liability claims, clarifying the court’s
holding in Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc.2 from seventeen
years earlier.3
Sikkelee arose out of the crash of a Cessna 172 airplane in
North Carolina in 2005. The pilot David Sikkelee was killed
from the burns and injuries he sustained in the crash.4 His wife
brought a lawsuit in 2007 in the U.S. District Court for the Mid-
dle District of Pennsylvania against seventeen defendants, alleg-
ing various state tort law causes of action. In 2010, the district
court, relying on the Abdullah decision, granted defendants’ mo-
tion for judgment on the pleadings. It held that Sikkelee’s state
* Partner, Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, McLean, VA office.
** Associate Attorney, Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP,
Milwaukee, WI office.
1 Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680 (3d Cir. 2016).
2 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999).
3 Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 683.
4 Id. at 685.
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law claims were within the preempted field of air safety.5 Sik-
kelee filed an amended complaint continuing to assert state law
claims and, in an attempt to plead a federal standard of care,
also alleged violations of numerous FAA regulations.6 Following
settlements and motion practice, the engine’s manufacturer—
Lycoming—remained as the sole defendant and faced claims of
defective design and failure to warn.7
Lycoming brought a motion for summary judgment on these
claims. The court granted the motion as to the defective design
claims related to the engine, holding that the FAA’s issuance of
a type certificate was based on Lycoming’s compliance with the
pertinent Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), and thus, the
federal standard of care had been satisfied as a matter of law.8
The Third Circuit granted an interlocutory appeal of the order
granting partial summary judgment on the ground that it
“raised novel and complex questions concerning the reach of
Abdullah and the scope of preemption in the airlines industry.”9
The court ultimately concluded that “neither the [Federal Avia-
tion] Act nor the issuance of a type certificate per se preempts
all aircraft design and manufacturing claims. Rather . . . aircraft
products liability cases like [Sikkelee’s] may proceed using a
state standard of care.”10
The Third Circuit began its analysis by re-visiting its decision
in Abdullah. It noted that while Abdullah stood for the proposi-
tion that within the field of air safety “plaintiffs may bring state
law causes of action that incorporate federal standards of care,”
Abdullah was clear that the “field of aviation safety described . . .
was limited to in-air operations.”11 The court further bolstered its
conclusion that products liability claims such as those brought
by Sikkelee were outside Abdullah’s holding with the observation
that, as to a federal standard of care, engine design regulations
governing the issuance of type certificates are not as compre-
hensive as those governing pilot certification and in-air duties,
responsibilities, and rules.12 Having decided that the case was
outside the scope of Adbullah, the court next examined applica-
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 686.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 687.
10 Id. at 683.
11 Id. at 688–89 (emphasis added).
12 Id. at 689–90.
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ble congressional legislation to determine “whether Congress
expressed [a] clear and manifest intent to preempt aviation
products liability claims.”13
The court started by noting that, “[c]onsistent with the uni-
form treatment of aviation products liability cases as state law
torts,” there exists a presumption against preemption in the avi-
ation context.14 With that presumption in mind, the court
turned to the FAA and the pertinent regulations issued pursu-
ant to the FAA’s delegated authority. Finding it “significant” that
the Act contains no express preemption provision, the court
noted the Act provides that the FAA may establish “‘minimum
standards’ for aviation safety,” language it noted has been held
in other contexts to be “insufficient on its own to support a find-
ing of clear and manifest congressional intent of preemption.”15
Moreover, the Act’s savings clause is consistent with an intent to
permit states to retain regulatory power over certain aspects of
aviation.16 Noting that the Act itself “does not signal an intent to
preempt state law products liability claims,” the court turned to
the FARs.17
Starting with the notion that the regulations themselves are
“devoid of evidence” of intent to preempt state law, the court
then distinguished the design regulations at issue in Sikkelee with
the operation regulations at issue in Abdullah.18 Unlike regula-
tions governing in-air operation, design regulations “do not pur-
port to govern the manufacture and design of aircraft per se . . .
but rather establish procedures for manufacturers to obtain cer-
tain approvals and certificates from the FAA.”19 A type certificate
is merely a “baseline requirement” or, mirroring language from
the Act, simply a “‘minimum standard[.]’”20 Rather than estab-
lishing a comprehensive set of rules and regulations that can
function as a standard of care, design regulations are “in the
nature of discrete, technical specifications that range from sim-
ply requiring that a given component part work properly . . . to
prescribing particular specifications for certain aspects (and not
even all aspects) of that component part” that would be difficult
13 Id. at 690, 692.
14 Id. at 691–92.
15 Id. at 692 (citations omitted).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 693.
18 Id. at 693–94.
19 Id. at 694.
20 Id.
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to translate into a tort standard of care.21 Thus, the court found
that “Congress has not created a federal standard of care for
persons injured by defective airplanes; and the type certification
process cannot as a categorical matter displace the need for
compliance in this context with state standards of care.”22
According to the court, the language of GARA further bol-
stered the court’s conclusion. “By barring products liability suits
against manufacturers of these older aircraft parts, GARA neces-
sarily implies that such suits were and are otherwise
permitted.”23
Recognizing that traditional conflict preemption principles
would continue to apply in the rare circumstances in which a
type certification requirement and a state standard of care may
be at odds, the court ultimately held that “the field of aviation
safety . . . preempted in Abdullah does not include product man-
ufacture and design, which continues to be governed by state
tort law.”24
Later in 2016, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Texas considered the issue of whether state products liability
claims are preempted as a field in the case of Davidson v.
Fairchild Controls Corp.25 Davidson involved state products liability
claims against Fairchild over air cycle machines manufactured
by it and installed on a Twin Commander 690A that allegedly
exposed pilots on board to toxic fumes, causing injury.26 The
plaintiffs’ claims were based on state law defective product theo-
ries including defective design, failure to warn, and breach of
warranty.27 Fairchild sought summary judgment on the basis
that federal law preempted all of the plaintiffs’ claims. Relying
heavily on the Sikkelee decision, as well as a 2011 case out of the
Northern District of Texas, the court concluded that products
liability law is not preempted as a field.28 Rather, “the certifica-
tion system effectuates ‘baseline requirement[s]’ that ‘speak to a
floor of regulatory compliance.’”29 The Davidson court answered
the question that the Sikkelee decision left to the lower court in
21 Id. at 694–95.
22 Id. at 696.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 704, 709.
25 No. H-15-0827, 2016 WL 5539982, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2016).
26 Id. at *2–4.
27 Id. at *4.
28 Id. at *7–8.
29 Id. at *8 (quoting Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 694) (alteration in original).
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that case, and concluded that conflict preemption did not apply
on the grounds that the “minimum standards of the federal avia-
tion regulations do not prohibit the design and manufacture of
safer aircraft and component parts.”30
In Escobar v. Nevada Helicopter Leasing, LLC, the U.S. District
Court for the District of Hawaii considered the claim of a plain-
tiff whose husband was piloting a Eurocopter EC130 B4 helicop-
ter when it crashed into mountainous terrain.31 The plaintiff’s
husband was employed by the company operating the helicop-
ter. Plaintiff brought claims against both the manufacturer and
the owner/lessor sounding in state law negligence and strict
products liability.32 The aircraft’s owner/lessor, Nevada Helicop-
ter Leasing, LLC (NHL), brought a motion for summary judg-
ment arguing that as an owner and lessor not in actual
possession or control of the helicopter, it was immune from lia-
bility for the accident due to the preemptive effect of 49 U.S.C.
§ 44112.33 That section provides that a lessor or owner is “liable
for personal injury, death, or property loss or damage . . . only
when a civil aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller is in the actual
possession or control of the lessor, owner, or secured party.”34
NHL argued that the provision preempted all of plaintiff’s state
law tort claims against it.
The court examined the preemption issue under both express
and implied preemption. The court rejected express preemp-
tion after minimal analysis, finding that the FAA does not con-
tain an express preemption clause.35 Turning to implied
preemption, the court quickly dispensed with field preemption
and analyzed the claims under the principles of conflict pre-
emption.36 After examining the legislative history of 49 U.S.C.
§ 44112, the court concluded that the statute’s purpose was to
“make it clear that an owner or lessor of an aircraft would not be
liable unless it had actual possession or control over the aircraft”
and that a state tort claim such as the one at issue in the case was
at odds “with the objectives and intentions of Congress.”37 Fol-
30 Id.
31 Escobar v. Nevada Helicopter Leasing, LLC, No. 13-00598 HG-RLP, 2016
WL 3962805, at *1 (D. Haw. July 21, 2016). Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman &
Dicker represented the helicopter’s owner/lessor in this matter.
32 Id.
33 Id. at *5.
34 Id. at *6.
35 See id. at *5.
36 See id. at *5–6.
37 Id. at *7–9.
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lowing an in-depth examination of the terms of the NHL’s lease
agreement with the operator, the court ultimately granted
NHL’s summary judgment motion on the grounds that NHL
had no “actual possession or control” of the accident helicopter
and was therefore immune from liability pursuant to 49 U.S.C.
§ 44112.38
In the next two cases discussed, U.S. district courts considered
the preemptive effect of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
(ADA), specifically its express preemption provision, which
states that “a [s]tate . . . may not enact or enforce a law, regula-
tion, or other provision having the force and effect of law re-
lated to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may
provide air transportation under this subpart.”39 In Golden Hawk
Metallurgical, Inc. v. Federal Express Corp., the plaintiff brought
suit against Federal Express Corp. (FedEx) alleging loss of two
shipments of precious metals by FedEx.40 The plaintiff further
accused FedEx’s employees of stealing the goods and replacing
them with rocks from one of FedEx’s shipping locations.41
FedEx’s terms and conditions expressly limited FedEx’s liability
to $100 unless a higher value is declared and paid. It was undis-
puted that the plaintiff did not declare a higher value for its
shipments nor did it pay for a higher value in its shipping
contracts.42
FedEx brought a summary judgment motion as to the claims
of state law (1) breach of duty as bailee; and (2) conversion,
asserting that both were preempted by the ADA’s express pre-
emption provision.43 The court noted that the U.S. Supreme
Court has interpreted the “provision broadly to preclude all
claims ‘having a connection with, or reference to, airline rates,
routes, or services.’”44 The court further noted the holding in
Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg “that preemption under the ADA de-
pends on whether a claim ‘is based on a state-imposed obliga-
tion or simply one that the parties voluntarily undertook.’”45
The court eventually granted FedEx’s motion as to the breach of
38 Id. at *11–13.
39 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).
40 Golden Hawk Metallurgical, Inc. v. Federal Express Corp., No. 15-14005,
2016 WL 5791198, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 4, 2016).
41 Id. at *1.
42 See id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at *2 (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384
(1992)).
45 Id. at *2 (quoting Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1431 (2014)).
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duty as bailee and conversion causes of action, finding that un-
like a claim for breach of contract, “these claims do not ‘serve to
effectuate the intentions of [the] parties . . . . Nor do they allege
violations of terms or conditions that ‘the parties voluntarily un-
dertook.’”46 As such, regardless of whether they arose from stat-
utory or common law, the claims were preempted by the ADA.47
The court in Shrem v. Southwest Airlines Co. undertook a similar
analysis to find that the plaintiffs’ claims were preempted by the
ADA.48 Shrem concerned two plaintiffs who filed a class action
against Southwest Airlines Co. (Southwest) over its handling of
plaintiffs’ travel credits obtained as the result of flight cancella-
tions, alleging California state law causes of action of, among
others, fraud, negligence, and unjust enrichment.49 Southwest
brought a motion to dismiss as to these counts arguing that such
claims were preempted by the ADA. Finding that the “forfeited
credits from cancelled flights [were] connected to both Defen-
dant’s rates (the credits are available for purchase of future
travel), and Defendant’s services (the credits provide access to
flights), [the court found] the causes of action [were] pre-
empted under the ADA.”50 The court further rejected plaintiffs’
argument that the claims were mere enforcement of self-im-
posed obligations, finding that plaintiffs’ claim that Southwest
violated a regulatory obligation to provide conspicuous written
notice of its terms and conditions as to travel credits as being
both outside the contract and based on a regulation, which does
not create a private right of action.51 Accordingly, plaintiffs’
claims of negligence, fraud, and unjust enrichment were pre-
empted under the ADA and dismissed.
II. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
In Dordieski v. Austrian Airlines, AG, the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Indiana declined to dismiss a claim
against Austrian Airlines on forum non conveniens grounds.52 The
plaintiff Mary Dordieski, who lived in Indiana, “suffer[ed] from
46 Id. (citations omitted).
47 Id.
48 Shrem v. Southwest Airlines Co., No. 15-cv-04567-HSG, 2016 WL 4170462, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016).
49 Id. at *1.
50 Id. at *3.
51 Id. at *3–4.
52 Dorieski v. Austrian Airlines, AG, No. 2:15CV180-PPS/PRC, 2016 WL
4437958, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 23, 2016).
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spina bifida, as a result of which her right leg [was] deformed
and ha[d] always been outstretched and rigid since birth.”53 She
was “confined to a wheelchair and incapable of any self-sup-
port.”54 Dordieski and her caregiver purchased tickets for an
Austrian Airlines flight from Chicago to Vienna with a final des-
tination of Skopje, Macedonia. The tickets were purchased spe-
cifically for the bulkhead section of the aircraft to accommodate
Dordieski’s disability.55 She and her caregiver boarded the flight
without incident, but due to a mechanical issue, the aircraft
made an emergency landing in Toronto. After an overnight stay,
they returned to the Toronto airport the following day for the
new flight continuing to Vienna. Austrian Airlines, however, did
not assign them bulkhead seats for the new flight, but rather it
assigned them regular seats that did not accommodate her disa-
bility. Despite protest by both Dordieski and her caregiver,
Dordieski claimed that Austrian Airlines’ employees or agents
forced her into a regular seat and forced her outstretched leg
into the inadequate space afforded to it, thereby breaking her
leg.56
Austrian Airlines sought dismissal of the case on forum non
conveniens grounds. The court began by noting the general stan-
dard that
a court has discretion to dismiss a case on the grounds of forum
non conveniens when an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear
the case, and trial in the chosen forum would establish oppres-
siveness and vexation to a defendant out of all proportion to
plaintiff’s convenience, or the chosen forum [is] inappropriate
because of considerations affecting the court’s own administra-
tive and legal problems.57
The court further noted the “plaintiff’s choice of forum should
seldom be disturbed” and that the defendant bears a “heavy bur-
den” in seeking the exceptional remedy of a forum non conveniens
dismissal because “granting such a motion usually launches a
plaintiff into a foreign court and the logistical hassles that come
with it.”58




57 Id. at *2 (quoting Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549
U.S. 422, 429 (2007)) (alteration in original).
58 Id. at *2.
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The appropriateness of an alternative forum is a “two part in-
quiry: availability and adequacy.”59 Austrian Airlines argued that
Canada was the more appropriate forum because when
Dordieski was issued a new boarding pass in Toronto, that con-
stituted a new “contract for carriage” and thus constituted an
available forum pursuant to Article 33 of the Montreal Conven-
tion.60 The court was unpersuaded, finding that “[t]he unfore-
seen stopover in Canada, occasioned by circumstances beyond
[Dordieski’s] control and not of their choosing, did not result in
a new contract” but rather represented a mere modification of
the original contract.61 Without a new contract, the court deter-
mined that Canada was neither an available nor an adequate
forum.
Nevertheless, the court embarked on the traditional public
and private interest factor examination between Indiana and Ca-
nada as potential forums for the litigation, with, as the court
described it, a “thumb on the scale in favor of Indiana” due to it
being the plaintiff’s home and choice of forum.62 Turning to
the private interest factors of (1) relative ease of access to proof;
(2) availability of compulsory process for unwilling witnesses;
(3) cost of attendance of witnesses; and (4) “all other practical
problems,” Austrian Airlines argued that factors (1) and (2)
were in favor of Canada because key witnesses and evidence
were in Canada.63 The court rejected these arguments, noting
that the argument as to ease of access was speculation because
Austrian Airlines failed to produce any proof about the resi-
dences of the passengers or crew, all of which would have been
available via its flight manifest and, regardless of difficulty of ac-
cess, the difficulties would fall equally on both parties. As to the
cost of transporting witnesses, the court took note that Austrian
Airlines’ very business was transporting people, while plaintiff
was an individual confined to a wheelchair and as such, issues of
“expense and inconvenience” clearly favored the plaintiff.64
Overall, the court found the private interests weighed in favor of
Indiana.
As to public interests, the court found that those too weighed
in favor of Indiana, noting that the stop in Canada on this flight
59 Id. at *3 (quoting Kamel v. Hill-Rom Co., 108 F.3d 799, 802 (7th Cir. 1997)).
60 Id.
61 See id.
62 Id. at *4.
63 Id.
64 Id.
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was unintended and unforeseen as compared to Indiana where
the plaintiff lives and which has an interest in resolving its citi-
zen’s claims.65 The court ultimately determined that the United
States had the strongest ties to the case on the basis that the
plaintiff was a resident of the United States, the ticket was pur-
chased in the United States, the flight departed in the United
States, and Austrian Airlines conducted substantial and continu-
ous business in the United States.66 Finding that both the private
and public interest factors favored the Northern District of Indi-
ana, the court denied Austrian Airlines’ motion to dismiss on
forum non conveniens.
III. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
In Bernfeld v. US Airways, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois considered whether US Airways
breached Article 19 of the Montreal Convention with respect to
its handling of a flight delayed by a bird strike.67 The Bernfelds
traveled from Tel Aviv, Israel to Chicago, Illinois in October
2013.68 The first leg of the flight—Tel Aviv to Philadelphia—
arrived timely and without incident. However, the aircraft in-
bound to Philadelphia that was assigned to the Philadelphia to
Chicago leg of their trip suffered a bird strike on approach to
Philadelphia. The “aircraft had to be removed from service” and
the flight to Chicago was cancelled. The Bernfelds were re-
booked on the next available flight to Chicago and arrived there
ten hours after their originally scheduled arrival time.69
The Bernfelds sued US Airways alleging a number of causes of
action, including breach of Article 19 of the Montreal Conven-
tion. “The Montreal Convention is an international treaty that
standardizes liability and damages for claims arising out of inter-
national air travel.”70 Article 19 governs compensation resulting
from delays and states:
The carrier is liable for damage occasioned by delay in the car-
riage by air of passengers, baggage, or cargo. Nevertheless, the
carrier shall not be liable for damage occasioned by delay if it
65 Id.
66 Id. at *5.
67 Bernfeld v. US Airways, Inc., No. 14-cv-5573, 2016 WL 1583057, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 20, 2016). Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker represented US
Airways in this action.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at *2.
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proves that it and its servants and agents took all measures that
could reasonably be required to avoid the damage or that it was
impossible for it or them to take such measures.71
The court took note of case law interpreting Article 19 indi-
cating that to satisfy Article 19, a carrier must only “show that,
on the whole, it took measures reasonably available and reasona-
bly calculated to prevent the subject loss.”72 “[N]ot every possi-
ble precaution must be taken . . . . Instead, the carrier need only
show that it took all precautions that, in sum, were appropriate
to the risk.”73 The Bernfelds did not dispute that a bird strike
was unpredictable and unavoidable, nor did they dispute that
US Airways attempted to substitute in another aircraft. They fur-
ther could not identify any reasonable measure US Airways
could have taken to minimize the delay in their travel.
Rather, they attempted to argue that US Airways had no poli-
cies or procedures in place to avoid delays in such circumstances
or to otherwise mitigate or rectify the consequences of the can-
cellation of the flight. The court, however, found that these as-
sertions were directly contrary to a US Airways’ representative’s
deposition testimony and that the policies and procedures to be
followed in the event of a delay or cancellation were set forth in
US Airways’ Passenger Customer Service Plan and its Contract of
Carriage.74 Moreover, the court noted that the existence or ab-
sence of the policies was not determinative as to the question of
whether US Airways utilized “all reasonable efforts” to avoid the
delay.75 The court found that US Airways had met its burden
under Article 19, used all reasonably available measures, and
granted summary judgment in favor of US Airways as to the
Bernfelds’ Montreal Convention claim.76
Bintz v. Continental Airlines, Inc. concerned what constitutes an
“accident” under Article 17 of the Montreal Convention.77 In
Bintz, the plaintiff Tom Bintz was a passenger on a Continental
flight from Vancouver to Houston. During the flight, he “began
71 Id. (quoting Convention for International Carriage by Air art. 19, May 28,
1999, 1999 WL 33292734, at *34).
72 Id.
73 Id. (citation omitted).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at *2–3.
77 Bintz v. Continental Airlines, Inc., No. 4:13-0566, 2016 WL 6906901, at *1
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2016).
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to experience chest pains and cough up blood.”78 The captain
called MedLink, a service provided by MedAire that “flight crew
can [use to] speak directly to medical professionals in the event
of an in-flight emergency.”79 In an emergency, the crew can call
MedLink, speak with a MedAire operator, and be connected to
an emergency physician provided by a company called Emer-
gency Professional Services (EPS) to address the emergency.80
The captain was connected with EPS physician Dr. Boothe, who
recommended aspirin, antacid, and oxygen. The crew did as in-
structed but Bintz continued to deteriorate and a second call
was placed to MedLink. Dr. Boothe recommended a nitroglycer-
ine pill and asked the crew to take Bintz’s blood pressure, which
she identified as normal. During this time, another passenger
on board who was a cardiac nurse identified Bintz’s symptoms as
that of cardiac arrest and recommended diverting the flight. Dr.
Boothe, however, found that because Bintz’s vitals were normal,
the flight did not necessarily need to divert. The flight contin-
ued to Houston, with two more calls to Dr. Boothe en route to
update her on Bintz’s vitals, with Dr. Boothe maintaining her
recommendation that the flight continue to Houston. After
landing in Houston, Bintz went to a hospital where his heart
attack and permanent heart damage were confirmed.81
Plaintiffs sued Continental, United Continental Holdings,
MedAire, and EPS, arguing, “Mr. Bintz suffered severe and per-
manent damage to his heart as a result of the airline’s and the
medical providers’ failure to divert the plane or otherwise ap-
propriately address his medical emergency.”82 After motion
practice and several amendments to the complaint, the only
claim remaining against the defendants was for breach of Article
17 of the Montreal Convention. The Continental Defendants
and MedLink Defendants both brought motions for summary
judgment, arguing that their conduct after Bintz’s cardiac event
on the flight did not constitute an “accident” under Article 17.83
A claim for bodily injury under Article 17 consists of three
elements: (1) bodily injury; (2) caused by an accident; (3) that
occurs on an aircraft during an international flight.84 The court
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at *1.
81 Id.
82 Id. at *2.
83 Id. at *4.
84 Id.
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noted that “accident” has been defined as “ ‘an unexpected or
unusual event or happening that is external to the passen-
ger.’”85 Looking to a prior case, which concerned similar cir-
cumstances and similar defendants, the court noted that “a
failure to divert a plane after a medical emergency is not ipso
facto an accident.”86 The court further noted McCaskey’s instruc-
tion that “an injury resulting from routine procedures . . . can
be an ‘accident’ if those procedures or operations are carried
out in an unreasonable manner.”87 The court ultimately denied
the summary judgment motions, finding a number of disputed
issues surrounding the incident and citing to Dr. Boothe’s testi-
mony that Bintz’s symptoms were classic symptoms of a heart
attack and that “the quicker that treatment can be provided, the
better” as well as the passenger-nurse and flight attendant’s rec-
ommendations to the captain that the flight should be di-
verted.88 As such, the court ruled that disputed issues of fact
remained as to whether an “accident” had occurred and denied
the motions.89
In another case involving whether an “accident” occurred
pursuant to Article 17, the court in Lee v. Air Canada concluded
that an incident in which a passenger was struck on the head by
falling baggage was an “accident” pursuant to the Montreal Con-
vention.90 In Lee, the plaintiff Lisa Lee was seated in an aisle seat
on an Air Canada flight at LaGuardia bound for Toronto. An-
other passenger, whose own seat was located five rows behind
Lee, returned “against the flow of other boarding passengers” to
Lee’s seat area to stow his carry-on bag, as the compartment
near his own seat was full.91 In the process of hoisting his bag up
to the compartment, he was bumped by another passenger com-
ing down the aisle, lost his balance, and dropped his bag, strik-
ing Lee on her head and hand. After speaking with flight
attendants, Lee disembarked the plane to seek medical help.92
Lee filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
85 Id. (quoting Air France v. Saks, 740 U.S. 392, 405 (1985)).
86 Id. (citing McCaskey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 562, 574
(S.D. Tex. 2001)).
87 Id. at *5 (quoting McCaskey, 159 F. Supp. 2d at 572) (alteration in original).
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Lee v. Air Canada, No. 14-cv-10059 (SHS), 2017 WL 108058, at *1, *7
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2017).
91 Id. at *2.
92 Id.
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District of New York seeking damages for injuries suffered as a
result of the incident.
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, with
Lee seeking summary judgment that the incident was an “acci-
dent” under the Montreal Convention. Air Canada filed sum-
mary judgment on the grounds that it was not an accident
under the Convention and alternatively that Article 21’s limita-
tion of liability should apply to the incident. The court em-
barked on an in-depth examination of the definition of
“accident” as it has been interpreted by several decisions of the
district courts of New York. It began by noting the U.S. Supreme
Court’s broad definition from Air France v. Saks that an “‘acci-
dent’ arises ‘only if a passenger’s injury is caused by an unex-
pected or unusual event or happening that is external to the
passenger.’”93 The court observed, however, that this broad defi-
nition “does not mean that every injury that occurs on an air-
plane is the result of an ‘accident.’”94 The court then took note
of a split within the district courts of New York, with some courts
requiring a demonstration of a causal nexus between “any act of
judgment, exercise of control or application of carrier operation
that, regardless of fault, implicated the airline in some abnor-
mal, unusual, or unexpected role as a causal agent of the in-
jury”95 and other courts that have adopted the broad Saks
definition finding an “accident” to have occurred without even
considering whether the actions of the airline or crew had any
causal bearing on the incident.96 With no controlling Second
Circuit authority to guide it, Air Canada urged the court to ap-
ply the causal nexus test and to find that no accident had oc-
curred given that Air Canada’s crew “was not responsible for
supervising each passenger’s stowing of bags during the board-
ing process” and “was not in a position to prevent [the passen-
ger] from dropping his bag onto Lee.”97
In ruling that the incident did constitute an accident pursu-
ant to Article 17, the court essentially provided two holdings.
First, it concluded that neither the Convention nor the Saks de-
cision indicates that any causal nexus was required between the
operation of the aircraft or the flight crew and the injury and
93 Id. at *4 (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985)).
94 Id.
95 Id. (quoting Girard v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 00-CV-4559 (ERK), 2003 WL
21989978, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2003))
96 Id. at *5.
97 Id. at *6.
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thus concluded that this situation met the definition of “acci-
dent.”98 Nevertheless, even if some causal link were required,
under Second Circuit precedent, it could be satisfied in “situa-
tions where the flight crew has no ‘knowledge [of] or direct
complicity [in]’ the incident and where its causal role is ‘attenu-
ated and indirect.’”99 Noting that the crew “could have mini-
mized the risk of [the passenger] dropping his bag onto Lee by
taking actions such as warning passengers to take care when
passing one another in the aisle and in placing their bags over-
head,” to the extent any “‘practical ability to influence’” an as-
pect of the operations was required, that test would be met
here.100 The court, therefore, granted plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment on liability, finding that this event was an
“accident” under the Montreal Convention.
The court then turned to the Air Canada’s alternative motion
for limitation of liability under Article 21 of the Convention.
Pursuant to Article 21 of the Montreal Convention, an airline is
not liable for damages exceeding 100,000 SDRs101 if the carrier
proves that “such damage was not due to the negligence or other
wrongful act or omission of the carrier or its servants or agents”
or “such damage was solely due to the negligence or other
wrongful act or omission of a third party.”102
In its motion, Air Canada sought to cap its liability pursuant to
Article 21 on grounds that it was solely the other passenger who
dropped the bag, or the passenger that bumped him causing
him to drop the bag on Lee, that were negligent.
The court analyzed the case under traditional New York negli-
gence law principles. In support of its motion, Air Canada pro-
vided expert testimony that it “would not have been
reasonable—or even possible—to assist every single passenger”
and pointed to federal regulations and industry standards stat-
ing that “flight attendants must assist passengers with stowing
their bags only when requested or where passengers have appar-
ent physical limitations.”103 Moreover, Air Canada introduced
98 See id.
99 Id. (quoting Fulop v. Malev Hungarian Airlines, 175 F. Supp. 2d 651, 669
(S.D.N.Y. 2001)) (alteration in original).
100 Id. at *7.
101 Due to inflation, the limit is now 113,100 SDRs, or approximately $150,000
U.S. dollars.
102 Id. at *7 (quoting Convention for International Carriage by Air art. 21, May
28, 1999, 1999 WL 33292734, at *35).
103 Id. at *8–9.
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evidence demonstrating that its crew complied with all duties
and made all required announcements.104 The court granted
Air Canada’s motion for summary judgment and limited Air Ca-
nada’s liability to 113,100 SDRs of provable damages.105
IV. FEDERAL JURISDICTION—REMOVAL AND
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Siswanto v. Airbus Americas, Inc. concerns the crash of AirAisa
Flight 8501 on December 28, 2014, into the Java Sea while en
route from Indonesia to Singapore.106 “The crash resulted in the
deaths of all passengers and crew on board.”107 Plaintiffs, who
were personal representatives of heirs of deceased passengers,
sued several defendants in the U.S. District Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois alleging in their complaint that each “con-
tributed to the fielding of an accident aircraft that was
‘defectively and unreasonably dangerous’ in myriad respects.”108
Defendant Thales Avionics filed a motion to dismiss on grounds
of personal jurisdiction.
The accident aircraft was an Airbus A320-216, a model of
A320 that is certified by the European Aviation Safety Agency
but has not been type certified by the FAA. The A320-216 is not
operated by any U.S. Airbus customer.109 The accident aircraft
itself was designed, assembled, and sold in Europe and was
never operated in the United States prior to the crash. Defen-
dant Thales Avionics is alleged to have designed, manufactured,
and sold defective pilot tubes, flight augmentation computers,
and software that was used on the accident aircraft.110 Thales
Avionics is a French corporation with its headquarters and prin-
cipal place of business in France. The sales of Thales Avionics
products to Airbus for use on the accident aircraft occurred in
France and the products sold were all designed, tested, assem-
bled, and manufactured in Europe.111
104 Id. at *9.
105 Id. at *10.
106 Siswanto v. Airbus Americas, Inc., No. 15-cv-5486, 2016 WL 7178459, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2016).
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at *2.
110 Id.
111 Id. at *3.
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As to Thales Avionics’s contacts with the United States, it had
only one employee that resided in America.112 It had no real
property in the United States nor did it maintain a place of busi-
ness or even a phone number. It was not authorized to do busi-
ness in the United States and did not sell products directly to
the United States. However, it derived substantial revenue from
deliveries to the United States through sales to French purchas-
ers who subsequently ship the products to the United States.
From 2011 to 2015, “Thales Avionics’ revenue from deliveries to
the United States [was] 88, 96, 99, 116, and 85 million euros,
respectively.”113 Thales Avionics also participated in thirteen avi-
ation product industry exhibitions in the United States from
2011 to 2015.114
Because Thales Avionics was served with a summons pursuant
to the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act, service of
process on Thales Avionics of the summons and complaint was
proper.115 However, that Act does not override the constitu-
tional limitations of due process and thus, plaintiffs bore the
burden of showing that Thales Avionics, a foreign corporation,
had sufficient minimum contacts with the United States to sup-
port exercise of the Court’s adjudicative authority.116 Plaintiffs
proceeded only under a theory of general jurisdiction, which,
unlike specific jurisdiction, is “all-purpose jurisdiction,”117 and
thus, “the constitutional requirement for general jurisdiction ‘is
considerably more stringent’ than that required for specific ju-
risdiction.”118 “A court may assert general jurisdiction over for-
eign corporations only when their business contacts with the
forum (here, the United States as a whole), ‘are so continuous
and systematic as to render them essentially at home in the fo-
rum.’”119 Because Thales Avionics’s principal place of business
and state of incorporation are both located outside the United
States, and thus outside the “exemplar bases” for general juris-
diction, the court proceeded to analyze Thales Avionics’s con-
112 Id.
113 Id. at *2.
114 Id.
115 Id. at *3.
116 Id. at *4.
117 Diamler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014).
118 Siswanto, 2016 WL 7178459, at *4 (quoting Purdue Research Found. v. Sa-
nof-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 787 (7th Cir. 2003)).
119 Id. (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., v. Brown, 564 U.S.
915, 919 (2011)) (internal quotations omitted).
270 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [82
tacts with the United States to determine whether general
jurisdiction existed.120
As to Thales Avionics’s sales revenue derived from deliveries
to the United States, the court noted that “imputing general
personal jurisdiction solely from a defendant’s sales in the fo-
rum, even if sizable, would rip general personal jurisdiction
from its constitutional underpinnings.”121 In rejecting sales reve-
nue as a sufficient contact, the court indicated that a “corpora-
tion’s ‘continuous activity of some sorts within a state is not
enough to support the demand that the corporation be amena-
ble to suits unrelated to that activity.’”122
Turning to Thales Avionics’s participation in aviation industry
exhibitions, the court found that notion “equally unavailing,”
noting that “ ‘no case has ever held that solicitation alone is suffi-
cient for general jurisdiction.’”123 The court similarly rejected
the presence of a single Thales Avionics employee who resides
in the United States as sufficient to establish general jurisdic-
tion, noting that the employee is not the company’s president,
general manager, or principal stockholder.124 “While it is rea-
sonable to assume that the employee conducts business on be-
half of the company, the record fails to reflect a ‘continuous and
systematic supervision.’”125
Finally, plaintiffs argued that Thales Avionics’s association
with its parent company, Thales Group, subjected it to general
jurisdiction here by asserting that Thales Group’s contacts with
the United States should be imputed to Thales Avionics. The
court, however, rejected that argument too. According to the
court, even assuming Thales Group’s contacts were sufficient to
support general jurisdiction, “jurisdiction over a parent corpora-
tion does not automatically establish jurisdiction over a wholly
owned subsidiary.”126 Moreover, plaintiffs failed to introduce
any evidence showing “an unusually high degree of control
over” Thales Avionics by Thales Group such that the corporate
formalities between the two corporations should be disregarded
120 See id. at *5; Diamler, 134 S. Ct. at 760.
121 Siswanto, 2016 WL 7178459, at *5 (citing Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760–62).
122 Id. at *6 (citing Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 757).
123 Id. (quoting Kipp v. Ski Enter. Corp. of Wis., 783 F.3d 695, 699 (7th Cir.
2015)).
124 Id. at *6–7.
125 Id. at *7 (quoting Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 72 S. Ct. 413, 448
(1952)).
126 Id. (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 n.13 (1984))
(internal quotations marks omitted).
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as part of the jurisdictional analysis.127 As such, Thales Avionics’s
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was granted
and all claims against it were dismissed with prejudice.
In Dietz v. Avco Corp., the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania granted the plaintiff’s motion to re-
mand the case to state court following removal filed by the de-
fendants.128 Dietz arose out of the crash of a Mooney M20J-201
aircraft in Kansas City, Missouri. Shortly after takeoff, the air-
craft’s engine allegedly failed and the aircraft crashed during an
attempted return to the airport, fatally injuring the pilot-owner
and his wife.129
Plaintiffs filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas in Penn-
sylvania against several defendants, including Continental Mo-
tors, who manufactured the magneto on the accident aircraft’s
engine, which they allege was defective and caused the engine
to fail in flight.130 The Continental Defendants timely removed
the case alleging diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332, removal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, and
federal officer removal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442. Plaintiffs timely filed a motion for remand primarily pur-
suant to the forum defendant rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2),
but also challenging federal officer removal and alleging defects
in removal procedure itself.131
Turning first to federal officer removal jurisdiction, the court
found that the Continental Defendants were not entitled to re-
moval on that basis. Continental’s contention was that because
its employees acted pursuant to delegated authority of the FAA
for certification of products and components, they thus “acted
under color of a federal officer in performing those alleged ac-
tions[,]” and thus, removal was proper.132 The court, however,
rejected this contention. Relying heavily on the Seventh Cir-
cuit’s decision in Lu Junhong v. Boeing Co.,133 the court noted
that “certifications just demonstrate a person’s awareness of the
governing requirements and evince a belief in compliance” and
that simply “being regulated, even when a federal agency di-
rects, supervises and monitors a company’s activities in consider-
127 Id. (citations omitted).
128 Dietz v. Avco Corp., 168 F. Supp. 3d 747, 750–51 (E.D. Penn. 2016).
129 Id. at 751.
130 Id. at 750–51.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 752.
133 792 F.3d 805 (7th Cir. 2015).
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able detail is not enough to make a private firm a person acting
under a federal agency.”134 As to the Continental Defendants,
the court ruled that “Congress never intended to afford the
Continental Defendants federal officer status through their
compliance with federal laws, rules, and regulations, even if the
regulations are highly detailed and even if the defendants’ activ-
ities are highly supervised and monitored.”135
The court looked next to whether the Continental Defend-
ants violated procedural requirements with respect to removal
and found that the Continental Defendants had violated the
unanimity rule requiring all defendants to unanimously join in
the removal or consent to it by timely filing an express, written
indication of consent.136 The court found that the Continental
Defendants had failed to even consult some of the other defend-
ants prior to filing the notice of removal and that they had failed
to provide any written evidence at the time of removal of con-
sent from any of the defendants. Finding that the nominal party
and fraudulent joinder exceptions to the unanimity rule were
not applicable, the court concluded that the action should be
remanded to state court.137
With no federal question and no federal officer jurisdiction
available, the only remaining basis for removal was diversity ju-
risdiction. The court, however, found that removal based on di-
versity was defeated on the basis of the forum defendant rule,
which states that “ ‘[a] civil action otherwise removable solely on
the basis of [diversity jurisdiction] may not be removed if any of
the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants
is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.’”138 In
Dietz, three of the defendants were citizens of Pennsylvania. The
Continental Defendants asserted that these defendants were
fraudulently joined and thus should not defeat diversity jurisdic-
tion. The three defendants at issue were alleged in plaintiff’s
complaint to have designed, manufactured, tested, and sold the
gasket interface between the allegedly defective magneto and
the engine. Accepting the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint as
true as is required in a fraudulent joinder analysis, the court
found that these defendants were not fraudulently joined. On a
134 Dietz, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 754–55 (internal quotations marks and citations
omitted).
135 Id. at 755.
136 Id. at 756–57.
137 Id. at 757–59.
138 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2)) (alteration in original).
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similar basis, the court also rejected the contention that these
defendants were nominal parties.139
V. CONCLUSION
2016 was an eventful year in aviation litigation. It brought de-
cisions that remind aviation attorneys that they have the oppor-
tunity to provide significant value to their clients by staying
abreast of both the trends and the changes in law when it comes
to these fresh topics.
139 Id. at 758–59.
